Beyond Aid: New Sources and Innovative Mechanisms for Financing Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
Introduction
Official aid alone will not be adequate for funding efforts to accelerate economic growth and poverty alleviation and other Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa. Ultimately the private sector will need to be the engine of growth and employment generation, and official aid efforts must catalyze innovative financing solutions for the private sector. It is important to stress that financing MDGs would require increasing the investment rate above the domestic saving rate, and bridging the financing gap with additional financing from abroad.
1
This paper examines the level and composition of resource flows to Sub-Saharan Africa:
foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio debt and equity flows, bank lending, official aid flows, capital flight, and personal and institutional remittances. Recognizing that South Africa is expectedly the largest economy and the most dominant destination of private flows, the analysis focuses on the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa wherever appropriate.
2 The paper then examines some new or overlooked sources of financing such as diaspora bonds and remittances, and some innovative mechanisms such as future-flow securitization and partial guarantees provided by multilateral agencies, for raising additional, cross-border financing in the private sector. In passing, the paper also briefly discusses recent initiatives, such as the Global Alliance for
Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) and the International Financing Facility for Immunization (IFFIm) , that use innovative methods to front-load future financing commitments from bilateral donors in order to introduce more predictability in aid flows.
3 for complacency; efforts to explore new sources and innovative mechanisms for financing development in the region must continue.
The paper suggests several new instruments for improving access to capital of SubSaharan African countries. The analysis of country creditworthiness suggests that many countries in the region appear to be more creditworthy than previously believed. Establishing sovereign rating benchmarks and credit enhancement through guarantee instruments provided by multilateral aid agencies would facilitate market access. Creative financial structuring, such as the IFFIm, can help front-load aid commitments, although they may not result in additional financing in the long run. Preliminary estimates suggest that Sub-Saharan African countries can potentially raise $1 billion to 3 billion by reducing the cost of international migrant remittances, $5 billion to 10 billion by issuing diaspora bonds, and $17 billion by securitizing future remittances and other future receivables.
The paper is structured as follows. The following section analyzes trends in resource flows to Sub-Saharan Africa relative to other developing regions. The next section highlights some new sources and innovative mechanisms for development financing in the region. And the final section concludes with a summary of findings and some recommendations for the way forward. South Africa has received more than $4 billion annually since 1995, other Sub-Saharan African countries received less than $50 million annually during this period. Foreign investors appear to be averse to investing in Africa because of lack of information, severe risk perception, and the small size of the market that makes stocks relatively illiquid assets. One way to encourage greater private investment in these markets could be to tap into the diaspora outside Africa. Some initiatives being prepared by the diaspora is the formation of regional funds to be invested in companies listed on African stock markets. The relatively low share of recorded remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa is mostly attributable to a high share of informal transfers.
Trends in Financial Flows

Personal and institutional remittances
Institutional remittances, which include grants by U.S and European foundations, were another category of resource flows that are large and growing steadily. 14 Institutional remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa increased from less than $2 billion in the early 1990s to $5.3 billion by 2005. As with personal remittances, most institutional remittances went to the poorest 13 Page and Plaza (2006) estimate that 73 percent of remittances to Sub-Saharan African countries were through unofficial channels. Using this estimate, remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa through formal and informal channels would be more than $30 billion annually. 14 Institutional remittances consist of current and capital transfers in cash or in kind payable by any resident sector (that is, households, government, corporations, and nonprofit institutions serving households [NPISHs] ) to nonresident households and NPISHs and receivable by resident households and NPISHs from any non-resident sector and excluding household to household transfers (United Nations Statistics Division 1998). NPISH is defined as a non-profit institution that is not predominantly financed and controlled by government and that provides goods or services to households free or at prices that are not economically significant. countries, with low-income Sub-Saharan African countries receiving $4.9 billion or 1.6 percent of GDP in 2005.
Box 1: Reliance on Short-term Debt in Sub-Saharan Africa
Short-term debt comprises a large share of private debt flows to Sub-Saharan Africa. * Even as developing countries in other regions reduce their dependence on short-term debt, these flows continue to be a large and volatile component of private debt flows to Sub-Saharan Africa (see figure) . After a surge in private short-term debt flows to Sub-Saharan Africa during the mid-1990s, these flows turned negative from 1998 to 2002 after the Asian financial crisis. They have again increased in recent years as Sub-Saharan Africa's growth performance improved. Since 1990, most private debt inflows into Sub-Saharan Africa have been short term. The high share of short-term debt may be partly explained by the severe informational asymmetries and risk perceptions of investing in Sub-Saharan Africa. Similar factors also account for the dominance of foreign direct investment in private capital flows to Sub-Saharan Africa and the small share of arm'slength financing through bond issuance and portfolio equity. In situations characterized by high risks, investors typically prefer to take direct control of their investment through FDI (Hausman and FernandezArias 2001) or resort to relationship-based bank lending that is typically short term or can be secured by some tangible collateral, such as trade credits (See box 2).
Short-term debt has been a large and volatile component of private debt flows to Sub-Saharan Africa
A reliance on short-term debt can be risky for the receiving countries. Short-term debt tends to be procyclical in developing countries, increasing when economic growth is cyclically faster and declining when growth rates falter (Dadush, Dasgupta, and Ratha 2000) . Favorable conditions attract large inflows, encouraging potentially unsustainable levels of consumption and investment. Changes in risk perceptions, however, can lead to rapid reversals, imposing larger-than-necessary adjustment costs for the receiving countries.
* Short-term international debt is defined as cross-border debt falling due within a year. The original maturity concept followed by World Bank (2002) is used here. The Bank for International Settlements, however, uses a "remaining maturity" concept-that is, all cross-border debt falling due within one year is counted as short-term debt, regardless of its original maturity. (Dadush, Dasgupta, and Ratha 2000) . Although conceptually different, the trends in the two are usually similar.
Private foundations, such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, are increasingly becoming important players in financing development. U.S. and European foundations provide some $4.4 billion in grants annually for international development (Sulla 2007 provide support for broader sector-specific (education, health) strategies, and align these with Sub-Saharan African countries' own development priorities. 15 IDA countries (mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa) received an estimated $20 million from U.S. foundations in 2004, which was less than 3 percent of direct cross-border grants of $800 million provided by U.S. foundations in that year (Sulla 2007) . 16 See Powell, Ratha and Mohapatra (2002) 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 China's non-concessional loans to some countries have raised concerns that it may be free-riding in countries that received debt relief under the MDRI and the HIPC programs (Economist 2007) . According to some authors, however, the majority of the projects undertaken by China are in non-HIPC resourcerich countries, such as Angola, Nigeria, and Sudan (Goldstein, Pinaud, Reisen and Chen 2006) . In those countries, these loans are part of China's FDI directed to strategic resource seeking. 18 A $5 billion ChinaAfrica Development Fund has been created to support Chinese FDI in Africa.
Capital outflows from
New Sources and Innovative Mechanisms for Financing Development in
Sub-Saharan Africa
This section discusses some new or hitherto-overlooked sources and some innovative structures for development financing in Sub-Saharan African countries. First, the section discusses two new sources of financing: issuance of diaspora bonds and efforts to increase migrant remittances by reducing money transfer costs. The section then discusses some recent initiatives that involve innovative financial structures-multilateral guarantees that leverage official financing for mobilizing private capital and the IFFIm that front-loads aid commitments-before describing a more generalized financial structuring that allows private entities to issue debt backed by future remittances and other future-flow receivables. Finally, the section argues for establishing sovereign credit ratings for Sub-Saharan countries, because ratings are key to attracting private capital.
New sources of financing
Diaspora bonds
A diaspora bond is a debt instrument issued by a country-or, potentially, by a subsovereign entity or by a private corporation-to raise financing from its overseas diaspora. India and Israel have raised $11 billion and $25 billion, respectively, from their diaspora abroad (Ketkar and Ratha 2007) . These bonds are issued often in times of crisis and often at a "patriotic" discount. Unlike international investors, the diaspora tend to be less averse to convertibility risk because they are likely to have current and contingent liabilities in their home country. Further, the diaspora usually have a strong desire to contribute to the development of their home country and are therefore more likely to purchase diaspora bonds. Table 2 shows estimates of the diaspora stocks of Sub-Saharan African countries and their annual savings. The stock of Sub-Saharan African diaspora is estimated to be about 16 million, with 5 million in high-income countries. Assuming that members of the Sub-Saharan African diaspora earn the average income of their host countries and save a fifth of their income, their annual savings would be more than $28 billion. 19 Presently the bulk of this saving is invested outside Africa. African governments and private corporations can potentially tap into these resources by issuing diaspora bonds. Diaspora bonds can also provide an instrument for repatriation of Africa's flight capital, estimated at more than $170 billion (as discussed).
Diaspora bonds could potentially raise $5 billion to 10 billion annually by tapping into the wealth of the African diaspora abroad and the flight capital held abroad by its residents. Ratha and Shaw (2007) . Diaspora savings are calculated assuming migrants earned the average per capita income of the host country and saved one-fifth of their income. Source: Authors' calculations.
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Some of the constraints that Sub-Saharan African countries may face in issuing diaspora bonds include weak and non-transparent legal systems for contract enforcement; a lack of national banks and other institutions in destination countries, which can facilitate the marketing of these bonds; and a lack of clarity on regulations in the host countries that allow or constrain diaspora members from investing in these bonds (Chander 2001; Ketkar and Ratha 2007) .
assumed to earn half the average income in the host countries and saved 20 percent, they would still save over $10 billion annually. 20 South Africa is reported to have launched a project to issue Reconciliation and Development (R&D) bonds to both expatriate and domestic investors (Bradlow 2006 percent of the amount, and the cost from Cotonou, Benin, to Lagos was more than 17 percent (Ratha and Shaw 2007) . Reducing remittance fees would increase the disposable income of remitters, encouraging them to remit large amounts and at greater frequencies. It would also encourage remittance senders to shift from informal to formal channels.
Estimating the additional remittance flows that would result from a decrease in remittance cost is complicated by several factors. For example, remittances sent for an immediate family emergency may not be responsive to costs. However, estimates based on surveys of Tongan migrants indicate the cost elasticity to be in the range of .22, that is, a 1 percent decrease in cost would increase remittances by 0.22 percent (Gibson, McKenzie, and Rohorua 2006) . For example, halving remittance costs from the current high levels, from 14 percent to 7 percent for the London-Lagos corridor, would thus increase remittances by 11 percent. This change implies additional remittance flows of more than $1 billion every year.
Assuming that the reduction in remittance cost also succeeds in bringing half the unrecorded remittances into formal channels, this would result in an increase in remittances flows to SubSaharan Africa of $2.5 billion.
21 Ghana, which benefited from over $4 billion in debt relief under the HIPC and MDRI, just concluded a bond issue for $750 million with a 10 year maturity and 387 basis point spread. The resources will finance projects in energy, communications, roads, housing, forestry, and hydropower. Other Sub-Saharan countries that are potential candidates for entering the international bond market for the first time include Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia, all three of which have seen significant increases in the non-resident purchases of domestic public debt in recent years (World Bank 2007a). 22 Page and Plaza (2006) estimate that almost three-quarter of remittances to Sub-Saharan African Africa were through unofficial channels.
Remittances costs faced by poor migrants from Sub-Saharan African countries can be reduced by improving the access to banking for remittance senders and recipients and by strengthening competition in the remittance industry Trade finance is an attractive way of increasing short-term financing to risky African countries in the presence of asymmetric information. Firms operating in international markets require financing for the purchase of their imports and for the production of their exports. Many African firms, however, have no access to trade finance or instruments to support their operations because of information asymmetries and their perceived greater risk. Larger firms that have access to credit from importers, the banking system (typically from affiliates of European global banking corporations whose core business is often short-term trade finance), or other non-bank financial institutions often provide trade credit to their smaller suppliers, who in many cases have no access to credit.
In recent years, the export credit agencies of China and India have become increasingly prominent in promoting trade finance in Sub-Saharan Africa, not only for raw materials, commodities, and natural resources, but also for capital goods (machinery, equipment) and manufactured products. In 2006, the Export-Import Bank of India extended a $250 million line of credit to ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) to finance India's exports to the 15 member countries of EBID. It has also previously extended trade financing to the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (PTA Bank) for $50 million to promote India's exports to 16 eastern and southern African countries. The Export-Import Bank of China is financing a larger set of activities, providing export credit, loans for construction contracts and investment projects (including energy and communication projects), and concessional loans and guarantees.
The World Bank is supporting an innovative project through its Regional Trade Facilitation Program to address the gaps in the private political and credit risk insurance market for cross-border transactions involving African countries. The project is managed by the African Trade Insurance Agency (ATI), a multilateral agency set up by treaty, and brings together a group of countries in the southern and eastern African regions to develop a credible insurance mechanism. To date, ATI has facilitated $110.7 million in trade and investments in ATI member countries, using only $21.6 million of IDA resources-a gearing ratio of almost five to one in sectors that include mining (Zambia), housing (the Democratic Republic of Congo), flowers (Kenya), and telecommunications (Burundi and Uganda). Clients have indicated that without ATI's support, they might not have received the necessary financing.
Although trade finance can facilitate trade and economic linkages with Africa's major trading partners, Africa needs additional longer-term sources of external finance. Trade finance is typically short term and carries many risks associated with short-term debt (see box 1). The recent expansion of trade finance may also partly reflect the inability of Sub-Saharan African countries to obtain unsecured financing at longer maturities. Enhancing the scope and volume of trade finance can facilitate trade and improve regional economic cooperation, but additional external resource flows are required to finance the projects in infrastructure, manufacturing, education and health that have high social returns and involve significantly longer time horizons.
efficiency in Senegal (World Bank 2007c).
There is potential for extending the scope and reach of guarantees to use aid resources to catalyze large volumes of private financing in Sub-Saharan Africa beyond the traditional large infrastructure projects and beyond sovereign borrowers. Gelb, Ramachandran and Turner (2006) suggest that guarantees should be available not only to foreign investors but also to domestic investors including pension and insurance funds, to raise local currency financing. Guarantee facilities can be established to support several small projects in the same sector, similar to a "master trust" arrangement. Innovations include service guarantees that can protect investors against service failures in areas such as power, customs, and licensing that discourage private investment in Sub-Saharan African countries.
IFFIm, AMC and other innovative structuring by public-private partnerships
Several international initiatives are underway for innovative development financing mechanisms. They include a search for new sources of financing, innovative ways of realizing future commitments, and innovative ways of using existing resources. The IFFIm is an innovative structuring mechanism for realizing future aid commitments to introduce more reliable and predictable aid flows for immunization programs and health system development for GAVI. 24 IFFIm raised $1 billion in 2006 and plans to raise $4 billion more during the next 10 years by 'securitizing'-in other words, front-loading-future aid commitments from several donor countries (France, Italy, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).
The donor countries have signed legally binding agreements with the GAVI Fund Affiliate to provide future grants to IFFIm, which issues the bonds in international markets. IFFIm disburses the proceeds as required for GAVI-approved programs to procure needed vaccines and to strengthen the health systems of recipient countries. Future grant flows from donors are used to repay bondholders. The backing of highly creditworthy developed country donors has enabled IFFIm to issue AAA rated bonds in international capital markets at competitive spreads.
Such a facility, however, faces several constraints, including the question of "additionality" (whether the countries that bought the bonds will reduce aid), high transaction costs, and whether the coupon yield will be paid for by sovereign bond guarantors or subtracted from the proceeds. Birdsall and Subramanian (2007) argue that international financial institutions have traditionally under-funded the provision of global public goods (GPGs) and have not been adequately involved in the development of new GPG products such as the AMC, preferring instead to provide loans and grants to individual countries. 26 See Skare (2007) , Trepelkov (2007) , and the discussions of the Second and the Third Plenary Meetings of the Leading Group on Solidarity Levies to Fund Development established in March 2006.
(http://www.innovativefinance-oslo.no/recommendedreading.cfm, and http://www.innovativefinance.go.kr). Among the innovative financing projects, 28 countries of the Leading Group are considering introduction of an Air Ticket Solidarity Levy to funding for improving access to treatments against HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria through the International Drug Purchase Facility, UNITAID.
countries (e.g., eight countries including France have raised $250 million in 2007), but there are questions as to whether these were new taxes (IBRD 2007) .
27
These public-private partnerships, however, rely on donor government efforts to mobilize financing and are subject to the same concerns about aid allocation, coordination and effectiveness. These innovative projects are not designed for catalyzing private-to-private flows to developing countries from the international capital markets.
A new initiative by the World Bank Group-the Global Emerging Markets Local Currency (Gemloc) Bond Fund announced in October 2007-proposes to raise $5 billion from international capital markets to invest in local-currency bond markets in developing countries.
28
The Gemloc public-private partnership will mobilize local-currency denominated resources for governments in selected emerging market countries, thereby eliminating the devaluation risk associated with foreign-currency borrowing. Corporate bonds will be included subsequently, but at least 70 percent of the proceeds of Gemloc would be invested in local-currency bonds issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities.
The creation of an independent and transparent benchmark index and "investability" rankings of countries' local-currency bonds markets are expected to facilitate external financing flows to emerging markets. Like portfolio equity flows, however, the Gemloc is likely to favor middle-income countries with market access. Although the Gemloc plans to include Kenya, Nigeria and West African countries in a subsequent phase, most of the countries selected for the first phase (for example, Brazil, China, India and South Africa) are countries with sovereign ratings in the BB or BBB category. It is also not entirely clear whether the Gemloc would result in additional funding or whether it might substitute portfolio equity flows.
Future-flow securitization
Sub-Saharan African countries can potentially raise significant bond financing by using securitization of future-flows, such as remittances, tourism receipts and export receivables.
Securitization of future hard-currency receivables is a potential means of improving the access of transaction, the borrower pledges its future foreign-currency receivables-for example, oil, remittances, credit card receivables, airline ticket receivables-as collateral to a special purpose vehicle (Ketkar and Ratha 2001, 2005) . The special purpose vehicle issues the debt. By a legal arrangement between the borrowing entity and major international customers or correspondent banks, the future receivables are deposited directly in an offshore collection account managed by a trustee. The debt is serviced from this account, and excess collections are forwarded to the borrowing entity in the developing country.
29
This future flow securitization mitigates sovereign transfer and convertibility risks and allows the securities to be rated better than the sovereign credit rating. These securities are typically structured to obtain an investment grade rating. For example, in the case of El Salvador, the remittance-backed securities were rated investment grade, two to four notches above the subinvestment grade sovereign rating. Investment-grade rating makes these transactions attractive to a wider range of "buy-and-hold" investors (for example, insurance companies) that face limitations on buying sub-investment grade. As a result, the issuer can access international capital markets at a lower interest rate spread and longer maturity. Moreover, by establishing a credit history for the borrower, these deals enhance the ability to obtain and reduce the costs of accessing capital markets in the future.
30
We estimate the potential size of future flow securitizations for various kinds of flows, including remittances, for Sub-Saharan Africa based on the methodology of Ketkar and Ratha (2001, 2005) using an over-collateralization ratio of five to one and average flows in 2003-06.
These calculations indicate that the potential future flow securitization is $17 billion annually, with remittance securitization alone in the range of $2 billion (table 3) . These include only the securitization of remittances recorded in the balance of payments. The actual unrecorded remittances through formal and informal channels are estimated to be a multiple in several countries (Page and Plaza 2006) . 29 Such transactions also often resort to excess coverage to mitigate the risk of volatility and seasonality in future flows. 30 Obtaining a rating is important for raising not only bond financing or bank loans, but also foreign direct investment and even official aid (Ratha, De and Mohapatra 2007) . Any improvement in sovereign rating is likely to translate into an improvement in the rating of sub-sovereign borrowers whose foreign currency borrowing is typically subject to the sovereign rating ceiling.
Remittances are a large and stable source of external financing that can be creatively leveraged for Sub-Saharan Africa's development goals. Remittances can improve capital market access of banks and governments in poor countries by improving ratings and securitization structures (Ratha 2006) . Hard currency remittances, properly accounted, can significantly improve a country's risk rating. It may even encourage many poor countries that are currently not rated to obtain a credit rating from major international rating agencies (see the following for more discussion). (2003) Still, this asset class can provide useful access to international capital markets, especially during liquidity crises. Moreover, for many developing countries securitization backed by future flows of receivables may be the only way to begin accessing such markets. Given the long lead times involved in such deals, however, issuers need to keep securitization deals in the pipeline and investors engaged during good times so that such deals remain accessible during crises.
Recovery of stolen assets
Other innovative ways of using existing resources includes recovery of flight capital and stolen assets. The cross-border flow of the global proceeds from criminal activities, corruption, and tax evasion are estimated to be more than $1 trillion annually. 31 Some $20 billion to $40 billion in assets acquired by corrupt leaders of poor countries, mostly in Africa, are kept overseas. 
Establishing and improving sovereign ratings can facilitate market access
Sovereign risk ratings not only affect investment decisions in the international bond and loan markets, but they also affect allocation of FDI and portfolio equity flows (Ratha, De and Mohapatra 2007) . The allocation of performance-based official aid is also increasingly being linked to sovereign rating. The foreign currency rating of the sovereign typically acts as a ceiling for the foreign currency rating of sub-sovereign entities. Even when the sovereign is not issuing bonds, a sovereign rating provides a benchmark for the capital market activities of the private sector.
Borrowing costs rise exponentially with a lowering of the credit rating ( figure 5 ). There is also a threshold effect when borrowing spreads jump up as the rating slides below the investment grade (Ratha, De and Mohapatra 2007) . A borrowing entity with a low credit rating, therefore, can significantly improve borrowing terms (that is, lower interest spread and increase maturity) by paying up front for a better credit rating.
Only 21 Sub-Saharan African countries had been rated by a major international rating agency as of November 2007 (Table 4) . 33 The average rating of Sub-Saharan African countries remains low compared with other regions, restricting the access of their private sector to international capital. As noted in the previous section, private debt and equity flows to Sub-32 For example, Nigeria has been successfully recovered half a billion dollars in stolen assets from Swiss sources with cooperation of the World Bank, civil society and the Swiss authorities. 33 Ratha, De and Mohapatra (2007) argue that several factors may make it difficult for poor countries to get rated. The information required for the rating process can be complex and not readily available in many countries. The institutional and legal environment governing property rights and sale of securities may be absent or weak, prompting reluctance on the part of politicians to get publicly "judged" by the rating analysts. The fact that the country has to request a rating, and has to pay a fee for that, but has no say over the final rating outcome can also be discouraging.
Saharan African countries were the lowest among all regions. Some authors have pointed to the existence of an "Africa premium"-equivalent to roughly 2 rating notches or 200 basis pointseven for relatively better-performing countries with above-median growth and low aiddependence (Gelb, Ramachandran and Turner 2006) . At the sub-sovereign level, few firms in Sub-Saharan Africa outside of South Africa are rated by the three international rating agencies.
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Several firms are highly creditworthy in local currency terms but they are constrained by either an absent or low foreign currency sovereign rating. Model-based estimates indicate that several unrated Sub-Saharan African countries would be rated higher than currently believed. Drawing on the well-established literature on the empirical determinants of sovereign ratings, Ratha, De, and Mohapatra (2007) Investors have been attracted by high yields relative to the perceived risk, better macroeconomic fundamentals, and diversification benefits (IMF 2006 (IMF , 2007 . Countries that have elicited the most investor interest are Bostwana, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia.
Ghana just became the first post-HIPC debt relief candidate to access international capital markets with a new sovereign bond issue. 36 Also, Gabon, an oil-exporting middle-income African country, is preparing to raise $1 billion in international capital markets; it was rated by The 10-year dollar bond issued on September 27, 2007 was sold at par to yield 8.5 percent. The proceeds of the bond would be used to improve Ghana's infrastructure. 37 Both rating agencies assigned Gabon a BB-rating, citing its relatively high income per capita and large external and fiscal surpluses derived from buoyant oil revenues. The proceeds of the bond will be used to buy back outstanding Paris Club debt. ("Gabon assigned 'BB-' long-term issuer default rating with stable outlook -Fitch"
Conclusion
Both official and private flows to Sub-Saharan Africa have increased in recent years, a welcome reversal of the declining or flat trend seen during the 1990s. The picture is less rosy, however, when Sub-Saharan Africa is compared to the other developing regions, and more importantly, to its enormous resource needs for growth, poverty reduction, and other Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Sub-Saharan Africa outside South Africa continues to depend on official aid. The recent increase in ODA appears to be driven by one-off debt relief provided through HIPC and MDRI; the prospect for scaling up aid is not entirely certain. 38 The relatively small FDI flows to the region are concentrated in enclave investments in oil-exporting countries.
Portfolio bond and equity flows are non-existent outside South Africa. Private debt flows are small and dominated by relationship-based commercial bank lending; and even these flows are largely short-term in tenor. More than half of the countries in the region do not have a sovereign rating from the major credit rating agencies, and the few rated countries have sub-investment grade ratings. Low or absent credit ratings impede not only sovereign, but also private sector efforts to raise financing in the capital markets. Capital outflows appear to be smaller than in the previous decade, but the stock of flight capital from the region remains very high. Migrant remittances appear to be increasing, but a large part of the flows bypass formal financial channels.
In short, the development community has little choice but to continue to explore new sources of financing, innovative private-to-private sector solutions, and public-private partnerships to mobilize additional international financing. An analysis of country creditworthiness suggests that many countries in the region may be more creditworthy than previously believed. Establishing sovereign rating benchmarks and credit enhancement through guarantee instruments provided by multilateral aid agencies would facilitate market access.
Creative financial structuring such as the International Financing Facility for Immunization (IFFIm) can help front-load aid commitments, although these may not result in additional financing in the long run. Preliminary estimates suggest that Sub-Saharan African countries can potentially raise $1-3 billion by reducing the cost of international migrant remittances, $5-10 billion by issuing diaspora bonds, and $17 billion by securitizing future remittances and other future receivables.
In raising financing via these means, African countries will face several challenges.
Leveraging remittances for Sub-Saharan Africa's development will imply efforts to significantly improve both migration and remittances data. Remittances are private flows, and governments
should not try to direct the use of remittances nor should they think of them as a substitute for official aid. Instead, governments should try to reduce costs, increase flows through banking channels, and constructively leverage on these flows to improve capital market access of banks and governments in poor countries by improving ratings and securitization structures.
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Efforts to attract private capital to Africa are constrained by shallow domestic financial markets, lack of securitization laws, a paucity of investment-grade firms and banks in localcurrency terms, and absence of national credit-rating agencies. It is worth mentioning that if
Africa were successful in attracting private capital, volatility in capital flows can complicate the management of the exchange rate and monetary policies. Foreign-currency denominated debt can lead to currency mismatches. Large inflows can also lead to appreciation of domestic currencies, adversely affecting international competitiveness. Some capital flows can reverse rapidly with potentially destabilizing effects on the financial markets.
The findings in this paper suggest that Sub-Saharan African countries need to make external finance more broad-based, attract a broader category of investors such as pension funds and institutional investors; and expand the role of public-private partnerships to raise additional external financing. 40 Donors and international financial institutions can play an important role by providing guarantees, political risk insurance, help in establishing ratings, and providing advice on financial instruments such as securitization of remittances and other future-flow receivables.
Accessing private capital markets in a responsible manner will require a sound contractual environment as well as credible monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies.
